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ABSTRACT
The object of this article is to present a contribution method to
the estimation of intangible investments in the French
industrial sector. We will take from several experiment cases to
highlight the under-estimation of intangible investments by
showing the malfunctionings that it brings about. We will then
suggest a method to handle the overall investment : economic
balances. We will draw on especially two principal
interventions where we are associated with the implementation
of investments, which were tangible as well as intangible :
- The first case (Case A) is that of a 2000 person food-
processing enterprise with two main factories of which one has
invested extensively in automation (-).
- The second case (Case B) is a 400 person metal-working
enterprise which is in the process of modernizing some of its
equipment and establishing new conception techniques (-).
More several illustrations from other industrial companies.2
INTRODUCTION
Today, intangible investments represent an increasing weight
in addition to tangible investments. As a rough guide, we can
name a few of the reasons given to explain this phenomenon :
- For J. Morin (Morin, 1985), the reinforcement of a company's
excellence in its professions not only requires acquisition of
competence but also intangible investments in order to adapt
and perfect its know-how.
- S. Urban and S. Vendemini (Urban and Vendemini, 1994)
consider that new market organization makes additional
intangible investment necessary, especially in the area of
information and decision systems.
- R. Perez (Perez, 1988) through case studies, also shows that
the complexity of investments in industrial automation
coincide more and more with intangible investments for
example in the area of adapting and perfecting equipment.
Compared with the increase in intangible investments, there is
however a delay in the practices of accounting for them, which
brings about general perverse effects :
- Financial reports are false because of gaps in the counting of
intangible assets such as competence and experience as G.
Triolaire (Triolaire, 1994) emphasizes. It has a particularly big
impact in the cases of mergers ; takeovers and repurchasings,
since estimation methods do not sufficiently take intangible
capital and its long-term profitability into account.3
- M. Marchesnay (Marchesnay, 1993) shows that the lack of
assessing intangible investments false profitability calculations.
- By taking the fiscal impact to account there also can be an
effect on the company's strategy. In certain cases the company
opts for strategy with strong intangible investments which
diminishes its company tax, but penalizes stock market rates.
In other cases, the company is looking for high immediate
results, and it gives priority to tangible investments, which pay
for themselves over several years, and at the same time
minimizing intangible investments to the detriment of long-
term economic performance.
In order to take these difficulties into account, several
suggestions for assessing intangible investments have been put
forth :
- P. Boisselier (Boisselier, 1993), for example, pleads in favor
of assessing intangible investments under two conditions :
. That the spending be integrated in a project with a clearly
defined outline and which has been conceived in a profitability
perspective.
. That the amounts of intangible investments be analyzed
strictly in the same manner as tangible ones, which brings
about the elimination of expenses at the conception phase.
- The Jenkins committee of the AICPA (Bazet, 1995) also
makes recommendations for completing traditional annual
reports through qualitative and quantitative givens which
enable the assessment of intangible investments and their
impact.4
Finally, we can note that certain companies would like to be
able to evaluate their intangible investments in a more
complete manner, as emphasized in certain consultant reports
(CEGOS, 1987).
In this perspective, the object of this article is to present a
contribution method to the estimation of intangible investments
in the French industrial sector. We will take from several
experiment cases to highlight the under-estimation of
intangible investments by showing the malfunctionings that it
brings about. We will then suggest a method to handle the
overall investment : economic balances. We will draw on
especially two principal interventions where we are associated
with the implementation of investments, which were tangible
as well as intangible :
- The first case (Case A) is that of a 2000 person food-
processing enterprise with two main factories of which one has
invested extensively in automation (Bonnet and Leymarie,
1995a).
- The second case (Case B) is a 400 person metal-working
enterprise which is in the process of modernizing some of its
equipment and establishing new conception techniques (Bonnet
and Leymarie, 1995b).
More several illustrations from other industrial companies.5
I.  UNDER ESTIMATION OF INTANGIBLE
INVESTMENTS
The under-estimation of intangible investments is a generality.
It is particularly strong in the case of competence investments.
1.1. Generality of the underestimation intangible
investments
Generally, industrial companies only measure a small part of
their intangible investments, except in three cases :
- That which strictly to assessable definitions of the intangible
investment : purchases of patents or brands …
- That which is directly linked to the study and the
implementation of new products : time spent by survey offices
and by trials …
- The investment in training which is directly linked to the
implementation of a new technology (training budget).
The estimation of these three elements alone, reveals only a
small part of the overall intangible investments made by the
company. Thus, in the metal-working company (Case B) we
estimated that the performance indicators had only assessed 1.4
million francs in intangible investments for 1994, which
corresponded to the training budget whereas a deeper
assessment showed 3.6 million francs. The effect of this gap in
the assessment of intangible investments was that the
investments were accounting for as expenses, whereas in
reality, that corresponded to investments which had impacts on
the profitability of the enterprise for several years. As a result
the company's decision-makers were dealing with a faulty
information system which could lead to two types of managing
mistakes :6
- Too much importance put on tangible investments compared
to intangible ones. In order to avoid cashiering the expense
budget of the year in process, the company had make false
savings in certain cases, for example in the area of training,
with heavy impacts later on malfunctionings costs.
Doubtlessly, it would have been pertinent in this particular case
to make 4 million francs work of intangible investments
instead of 3.6 million.
- In other cases, the company accepted to overextend their
expense spending for intangible investments linked to a project
in order to avoid failure. This over expenditure was absorbed
by other sectors or company projects by implicitly giving
priority to certain intangible investments. Since this
hierarchical organization was not based on a reliable
information system, it was likely that the most strategic and
most profitable investments and projects would not be chosen.
Sometimes the person responsible in a sector where the most
investment was made, was penalized because of the budget
whereas in reality intangible investments had been
implemented after the decision was made at other levels of the
company. That was typically the case when a new machine was
act up in a production workshop and an adjustment and training
time was demanded.
This example demonstrates the fact that this company should
have, and would have measured their intangible investments
better by using a production indicator other than an accounting
indicator, which could have discerned two main categories in
this case :
- Intangible investments linked to the acquisition and the
perfecting of industrial competencies.7
- The cost of actions linked to management perfecting.
1.2. Particular case of the underestimation of intangible
investments linked to the acquisition and the perfecting
of industrial competencies
The analysis of two industrial investments cases discerned
three main types of costs linked to intangible investments
hidden in the expenses of the company at the time of the
acquisition of industrial competencies. It is the time spent by
directors and executives, the acquisition of external know-how
other than patents and licenses, and the costs of under
productivity during training.
a)  Time spent by directors and executives
In the case A (food product company), engineering service
time and design office time were accounted for in calculating
the investment amount, but the other executives and directors'
time was not accounted for. At the time of our intervention in
this company, it was observed that 20 % of the time that
directing executives spent in one year, was devoted to a new
factory project, mostly going to required meetings in order to
devise the investments files. The company did not
proportionately raise its number of chief executives during this
time in order to avoid increasing its visible costs. The
measuring of the time spent by executives during this test
period showed that a part of this overload was compensated by
about half by improving the executives productivity, thanks
especially to getting rid of tasks that had a very small added
value, or by stronger delegation. Nevertheless, approximately
the other half of this work overload had an impact on the
hidden costs linked to investment. The following phenomena
were especially noticeable :8
- Some executives accepted a heavy work overload over
several months, which had medium-term consequences on their
excess of stress and exhaustion with an effect on work
atmosphere : exacerbated contention between certain engineers
which brought about under-productivity, and the resignation of
some very competent engineers.
- In addition, several important tasks were sacrificed for the
project, which represented an opportunity cost to be added to
the total investment. For example, the engineering service put
aside tasks to improve its internal management, which led to
poor quality coordination between engineers and technicians,
and to under-productivity of the team members which was
evaluated at close to 3 million francs a year.
b)  The acquisition of external know-how other than patents
and licenses
Patent purchases are accounted for in the company's fixed
assets (count 205) whereas licenses, as well as training, come
under expenses. Nevertheless, all costs linked to the acquisition
of external know-how should be considered as intangible
investments, being aware that the risk and the profitability of
this investment can vary according to the adopted legal
enforcement. This type of investment would namely of the
following categories :
- Patent cost, or the flat sum paid over a minimal period of
license using.
- The cost of gathering the information necessary for the study
of an investment file : the purchase of documents, travel
expenses linked to visiting professional shows, equipment
suppliers, or other companies which use similar technology.9
- The cost of time spent within the company to structure the file
study (namely engineers and masters' time).
- Recruiting costs and costs linked to the under-activity of
people who are learning know-how which did not yet exist in
the company.
- Costs of technical assistance and training connected to the
purchase of new equipment or patents.
Figure 1 introduces the case of accounted for intangible
investments in a metal-working company (case B). It is the
perfecting of a simulation procedure which is associates with a
computer-assisted conception. This technology should allow
the company to obtain markets for very highly sophisticated
products, while respecting the demand for a reduction in study
delays. The company identifies a formal investment of 1
million francs. It is made up of computers, software, and
technical assistance. Another 1 million francs investment in
intangible goods, which was not counted, had to be added, as
figure 1 shows, and this almost doubled the official cost of the
investment budget corresponding to his innovation.10
Figure 1 :
Unaccounted intangible investment in the case of perfecting
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Source : Bonnet and Leymarie, 1995b.
In this case it can be noted that accounting for this intangible
investment gives several advantages to the company :
- First, study and perfecting time spent internally turn out to be
much less costly than external technical assistance. This could
lead to improving the complementary strategy between
bringing in external know-how and innovation adaptation work
done within the company.11
- In addition, if necessary investments in terms of training are
identified well, it prevents the under-estimation of needs. Such
an under-estimation would likely bring about insufficient
training sessions and high malfunctioning costs at the time of the
procedure's implementation : under-productivity, quality
defects, rejection reactions from personnel, etc.
c)  Under-productivity during training
More often, investment files depend on profitability
calculations which are based on the idea that there will be
optimum productivity from the very start. Reality seems quite
different because in order to achieve the desired level of
efficiency, six months to a year are necessary. For example,
this under-productivity was estimated at 1.5 million francs in a
25 million francs investment project case in the food-product
company (case A). Two main reasons could be given for this
phenomenon:
- Additional costs for the perfecting of procedures : even if the
investment was for equipment that was already reliable, it had
to be adapted to the particular conditions of the company's
implementation : making it compatible with the company's
other equipment adaptation of software of moulding
installations considering the specificity and the variety of the
products, standardization of equipment considering the
environment variables which were neglected at the beginning,
such as temperature, humidity, vibrations, etc.
- Additional costs in personal training : the initiation of the
installation was associated with break-downs and quality
defects because personnel were not sufficiently trained in the
precise procedures to use in each step of production. These
same phenomena were also observed in the metal-working12
company where the desired production rate took 6 months to be
achieved because of insufficient personnel training. The under-
productivity in this case was estimated at 1 million francs for a
20 million francs investment.
II. MALFUNTIONINGS CAUSED BY THE LACK OF
TAKING INTANGIBLE INVESTMENTS INTO
ACCOUNT IN AN ENTERPRISE
Despite the care and professionalism used in investment budget
preparation, three main deviations are observed in the analyzes
cases :
- The investment budget is well overextended because of
hazards or adjusting difficulties which were not expected at the
beginning.
- The implementation of the investment takes longer than
planned, with serious problems at the star-off.
- Once implemented, the investment does not bring satisfaction
or the expected revenue.
The conjunction of these three phenomena leads to a strong
decrease in investment profitability and even sometimes turns
very wonderful technological projects into genuine financial
disasters. We are going to examine six main causes of these
profitability-loss phenomena, with the cases of industrial
companies which were observed.
1.3. Personnel's reaction of rejecting new technologies
These rejection reactions lead to especially high costs since the
equipment is abandoned or sold in bad conditions. In case A,
the establishment of a new line of production resulted in the
manual use of automatic packaging machines for a year and13
half. The manufacturers considered that the equipment was not
perfected and in addition that this line "was not their problem",
but rather the engineering services. This resulted in additional
costs estimated at 10.5 million francs, meaning an excess of 28
% of the investment budget which was initially set at 27.5
million francs. Finally, the company had to relaunch a process
that would increase manufacturer involvement. It took 2 more
years for the line to function almost normally.
These rejection reactions are not very visible. For example, in
this food-product company, we noticed that manufacturers
sometimes passively watched the setbacks of new technologies
without ever suggesting ways to correct them. Their behavior
seemed to implicitly mean "let's let the engineering department
fail in this project to show that it cannot work if we are not
working together". To this phenomenon of sociological nature,
more technical reasons can be added. Indeed, the users had
information, often informal, about the conditions of the proper
functioning of the investment. Not taking this information into
account was a big mistake in that they modeled the procedures
of the technology to be implemented too quickly.
1.4. Personnel difficulties in learning and assimilating
technologies
In the working-metal company case, the directors were
confronted with a regression in the company's traditional
markets in the area of "fritté" metal production. This had lead it
to a strategic approach consisting in launching new products
which were more sophisticated and technologically more
complex which corresponded to very buoyant markets. This
product innovation resulted in two new demands on personnel :14
- To know how to implement the present equipment with more
precision (respecting very strict parameters in temperature,
proportions, etc.).
- To master new equipment which called for computer
programming knowledge.
The weaknesses in the company's competencies in these two
areas led to the partial failure in this product launching. Indeed,
the lack of mastering technologies led to touch-up rates which
were over 45% for some series, as well as more than 3 months
delays in delivering the first series. The malfunctioning costs
linked to these phenomena were estimated at 3.5 million francs
a year, to which a considerable commercial loss must be added
(loss of credibility on the market, competitors taking advantage
of the company's delay, etc.). In this case, our diagnosis
revealed two main difficulties in the assimilation of new
technologies :
- The absence of a cartography of the company's competencies
which could have helped the company target its products-
innovation strategy while considering its existing
competencies. A clearer view on this point would have
doubtlessly led to a more pertinent "impartition" strategy and to
the decision to sub contract the operations needing competence
which is difficult to acquire, as well as to the implementation
of adapted training.
- The lack of company competence in the industrialization of
the products : what seemed feasible in the research center
laboratories met with application difficulties in the production
phase. This malfunctioning more specifically revealed that the
company did not know how to carry out sufficient consulting
between the company's different services at the time of new
project. In this case of an estimated 2.6 million francs15
investment, no one really thought about whether adding 0.5
million francs would suffice on not acquire the necessary
know-how and avoid the much higher malfunctioning costs.
1.5. Investment inadapted to needs
Normally, the investment selection and preparation procedure
is conceived to avoid the risks of inadaptation to industrial
projects, as well as mistakes relative to the capacity of these
investments. Nonetheless, we have seen that these procedures
had weaknesses. Three main malfunctionings have thus been
noticed :
a)  Lack of "after-the fact" estimation of investment
profitability
This gap seemed to be systematically observed, even when
companies had rigorous budget control. This phenomenon
could be partly explained by the fear of having to admit that the
predictions were wrong. In several cases, the company
preferred to ignore the problem instead of reconsidering
keeping or getting rid of certain fixed assets. It was even more
damaging since the equipment was becoming quickly
obsolescent. The company was putting up with only partially
paid off fixed assets, which were unsaleable because they
waited a year too long to withdraw investments. The
malfunctioning costs were particularly high in this case
because they generated phenomena of different natures :
- Accelerated depreciation of equipment
- Maintenance costs
- Costs due to congested premises16
- Opportunity costs due to the fact that investments could have
been made for more useful equipment if other investments had
been cut before.
b)  Lack of equipment adaptability
The diagnosis of the studied companies revealed numerous
errors in investment predictions. These errors were sometimes
linked to a lack of intangible investment in an environmental
information system, which led to over-investing because of
activity or profitability predictions that were too optimistic, or
it led to under-estimating technological changes. The effects of
the incorrect predictions were amplified when the equipment
was not sufficiently adaptable, especially in the following cases
:
- The equipment was sometimes too specialized and
insufficiently multifunctional, and as a result it became
outdated whenever a small change in products or procedures
came about.
- Sometimes, the equipment and investments were sufficiently
modular, which led to compatibility or extension problems
when they needed to be complemented in order to increase
production capacity. In numerous cases, this difficulty came
from the company's negligent definition of equipment
compatibility norms and modularity norms, before launching
the project. This definition of norms could have been a very
small intangible investment which could have made a tangible
investment profitable for many years.17
c)  Choice of immature technology
Other needs were not taken into account in case A, when the
company chose a technology that was too recent or not
stabilized yet, thinking that it would get them a step ahead of
their competitors. This ended up to be a handicap because the
investment cost was not only higher, but in addition, they had
to reinvest the following year to update and make the system
sufficiently reliable. This especially was the case automatic
moulding systems where the company had to reinvest more
that 8 million additional francs after 2 years, whereas the initial
investment was 5.5 million francs. This example illustrates the
importance of equipment testing when the project is being
planned. In this instance, it would have been enough to ash the
technology supplier to give more references and to take the
time to go visit companies which were already equipped. This
would have allowed the company to realize they should wait a
year for the technology to mature while improving the present
equipment maintenance in order to make it last a little longer.
1.6. Technological perfectionism and difficulties in
perfecting technologies
If some sectors of the studied companies suffered from
technological backwardness, others had additional costs
because of the implementation of technology which is too
advanced. This especially led to technology implementation
difficulties which meant additional costs for perfecting the
technology, either from additional outside assistance or from
the company's personnel working overtime. At the root of this
sort of malfunctioning, the diagnosis revealed a flaw which is
two fold :18
- The division between engineering and production
departments, associated with the engineers' lack of listening in
order to reasonably satisfy the minimum technological
perfectioning needs (Berry, 1987).
- The interest in prestige that comes with establishing
sophisticated technologies. Of course, this desire could be
legitimated for engineers or technicians who have very
advanced technological training. However, it should have been
moderated by demonstrating the obvious additional costs due
to perfecting and by considering the customers final needs.
This type of cost analysis would have helped to measure the
reasonable level of technical perfectionism, which would have
given the decision-makers a technological innovation
management tool.
1.7. Increase of certain malfunctionings
The new production technologies frequently represented a high
investment cost in case A, and we observed an increase in
depreciation allowances in the make-up of cost prices. This
meant that an hour of halted production on very automated
equipment was generally much more costly than on a more
classic machine. Thus, the cost of stopping a production line
was estimated at 5400 francs an hour, whereas a few people
would have sufficed to pilot this machine.
We observed a similar phenomenon in a chemical company,
where process regulating flaws led to a 15 million francs over
consumption of energy, meaning four times more than in
former units.
This cost increase phenomena was due to the under estimation
of the risk of bringing in malfunctionings which were present19
in the former production system. This importation of
malfunctionings was even more pernicious since there was
supposedly a complete renewal process which was carried out
when the company created this new unit : the premises,
equipment and technology were new, the personnel was
partially renewed, and former problems were believed to be
eliminated. Reality was very disappointing after the
implementation of the investment when they realized the new
unit had been "contaminated" by previous malfunctionings.
Without realizing it the company had in fact transposed the old
ideas of work organization or inadapted communication means,
which had insidiously continued in the technological project.
1.8. Company chaos caused by investment projects
Unlike the five previous cases of malfunctioning costs that
were directly linked to investments, this type of additional cost
is indirectly caused by the implementation of the investment.
The effect is not felt on the equipment or product level, but in
the rest of the company.
In the case of company A, the implementation of investment
projects was overshadowed by delays, cancellations, despite
the use of computerized project management tools. This was
due to three kinds of vagaries :
- Difficulties in perfecting certain techniques
- Suppliers who delayed deliveries, which often had nothing to
do with the purchased equipment, but which delayed the
overall project.
- Lack of decision-making by the company about technical or
investment amount choices, which forced them to start
consulting suppliers all over again.20
These vagaries shattered the initially planned program and led to
two types of additional costs :
- Additional costs for project handling, with increased need for
outside engineering company interventions.
- A loss of earnings due to the delay in starting the project.
III.  ECONOMIC BALANCE EVALUATION
METHODS FOR TANGIBLE AND INTANGIBLE
INDUSTRIAL INVESTMENTS
In order to cure the aforementioned malfunctionings, we
experimented with an intangible investment evaluation method
in the form of economic balances.
3.1. Economic balance suggestion
It is a matter of simply completing investment profitability
calculations based on usual criteria with three types of givens
1 :
- Financial givens, on hidden investment costs and
performances. This mainly consists in highlighting the hidden
part of intangible investments as well as the expected hidden
performances.
- Quantitative givens which were not completely financially
estimated, and which allow a better understanding of potential
generated by the investment : number of people trained in new
operations, reduced number of customer complaints, etc.
                                                
1 The simultaneous resorting to qualitative, quantitative and financial givens
is presented by H. Savall in  Enrichir le travail humain : l'évaluation
économique, Dunod, 1974.21
- Qualitative givens which are relative to strategic advantages
obtained thanks to the investment. This can be assessed either
in external strategic terms (acquisition of a new profession or
company image consolidation in a new market for example), or
in terms of internal advantages (an increase in organization
flexibility for example).
It is useful to then present these givens in a synoptic manner, in
order to give the decision-makers the overall elements needed
for judgment which are not explicit then only the visible cost-
performance financial calculations are considered. Among the
two experiment cases, one example can be given on how to set
up self-regulation in a metal-working company sanding
workshop (see figure 2). The tangible share of the investment
consisted in setting up a small laboratory and slightly
modifying the installation in order to treat and control long
pieces. Thus the implementation of self-regulation consisted in
getting the operators to analyze the sanding vat at each work
station. Figure 2 presents the complete outcome of this micro-
investment in which the reimbursement time was largely
inferior to one year.
The economic balances of investment projects consisted in
accounting for more givens than the usual methods used for
estimating and selecting information relative to visible
investment cost-performances. This especially was true for the
following categories :
- Accounting for visible and hidden parts of the investment.
- The analysis of the investment impact on visible and hidden
performances connected to the decrease in certain
malfunctioning costs.
- The inventory of qualitative and quantitative advantages
which are not entirely financially assessable, but of which the22
accounting for can make the scales tilt in favor of an
investment project which is of better quality than another.
The objective of economic investment balances thus consisted
in making numerous variables obvious, whereas they are
usually hidden by decision-making tools are too simplistic, like
the case of using only visible performance criteria.23
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3.2. Calculating the complete cost of investment
The economic balance experiments consisted in grouping the
overall costs of the investment :
- The visible costs, whether it is for equipment purchases and
improvement costs, or the identified supplemental costs :
training sessions, supplies and small tools.
- The hidden investment costs : time spent by directors and
executives, the under-production during training periods, etc.
For instance, the setting up of new station for control with
ultra-sound in the metal-working company (case B) required an
investment total composed of the following :
- Purchase of an air-conditioned cubicle : 60 000 F
- Purchase of computer and software material : 55 000 F
- Improvement of handling and stock systems  :  45 000 F
- Time spent in file studies, the improvement
of ergonomics and perfecting assembly
techniques (4000 hours at 150 F / hour) : 60 000 F
TOTAL 220 000 F
Through this example it can be seen that an investment cost
estimation which was carried out in the usual ways would have
only shown the two first elements out of the four (air-
conditioned cubicle and computer equipment). That represented25
105 000 F out of the 220 000 F total, which doubles the
investment calculation base !
3.3 Qualitative and quantitative estimation of the creation
of potential
In the studied cases, the middle or long term economic
performances were only partially financially assessable
2.
However it was useful to complete the investment files with
qualitative or quantitative givens which could help the
decision-makers and stock holders with criteria that could be
just as important as the financial criteria. For main types of
improvement impacts linked to investments could be accounted
for, like we measured in the metal-working company (case B).
- An increase in the company's professional competencies or in
new professions like in the case of perfecting new techniques
like numeric simulation.
- An improvement of the image that present or potential
customers have of the company, thanks to intangible
investments which allowed the company to reduce delays.
- An increase in the company' flexibility and its adaptation
ability : this was the case for installation within the production
department in order to reduce conception delays. The
investment in operators' competence and ability to do several
jobs also contributed to making this factory flexible.
- Risk reducing, thanks to malfunctioning prevention action
investments (preventive interview for example) and thanks to
the extreme caution the company used in relation to its
                                                
2 For an example of a tentative to estimate long-term economic
performances, see Baglin and Malleret, "Evaluation économique du juste à
temps", AFC congress, 1990.26
environment (making executives responsible by dividing them
among product categories for example).
Some of these improvements could be directly financially
estimated, like reducing conception delays which allowed them
to gain market shares and increase their commercial margin.
The estimation of the impact of other investments was more
controversial, like in the case of risk reducing
3.
3.4.   Analysis of the investment impact on visible and hidden
performances
The economic investment balances enabled the completion of
the visible performance estimation (productivity or
consumption gains…) with an estimation of hidden
performances. This called for an analysis of malfunctioning
costs, which could be reduced thanks to the investment. For
this, it was suitable to take the most complete inventory of
hidden costs and to make a prognosis about the investment
impact on reducing these costs. In order to remain realistic, it
was suggested to list the reduction rates on a scale of only four
levels (0 %, 1/3, 2/3 and 100 %) because it was practically
impossible to determine these rates with more precise
percentages. Figure 3 shows an example of this type of
estimation in the case of a food product factory, in the
                                                
3 See G. Charreaux, Gestion Financière, LITEC, 1993, p. 264 and 265.
Also see the authors named by G. Charreaux on this subject, like S. Myers,
"Determinants of corporate borrowing", Journal of Financial Economies,
1977 and C. Kester, "Today's options for tomorrow's growth",  Harvard
Business Review, 1984. We keep in mind these authors' suggestion to
compare this kind of investment with the options of buying stock shares
while highlighting the specificities connected to the different impact of the
interest rates according to the two cases, and in fact there is no exclusivity
unlike stock share purchasing options.27
framework of an investment project including 120 000 F in
operator training in self-regulation and first level maintenance.
Figure 3 : Prognosis example for reducing the hidden costs
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TOTAL 444 000 F 41 % 262 000 F
In this case it can be noted that the prediction gave a rough
value at the start. But this prediction was taken into
consideration because of the fact that it was a true contract
between the executives of the service which had asked for the
investment, and the directors of the company, who agreed on
the financing.
The addition of hidden performances with visible ones allowed
them to select certain investments which would have been
eliminated without the rise in value of hidden performances. In28
the case of the metal-working factory (case B), the setting up of
a method service unit within the workshops, corresponding to a
768 000 F investment could not be justified with only the 225
000 francs per year productivity gains. On the other hand, the
analysis of the impact on hidden costs connected to lack of
quality highlighted a  supplementary treasury flow of 350 000
francs per year, meaning a performance total of 575 000 francs
per year which enable them to reimburse the investment in less
than a year and a half.
3.5.  Contribution of economic balances to usual investment
selection methods
An investment case dealing with a sanding technique in
company B proved to teach a lot about the contribution of this
type of method, especially in the following points :
- Calculating the investment only on the visible costs-
performances criteria would have made the project impossible,
because the PNV (Present Net Value) could appear inferior to
those of other big investment projects, and also because of the
reimbursement delay which was longer than three years.
- In the factory had decided to go ahead with this investment,
without clarifying the economic balance, apparent damage
would have been done to the maintenance service budget,
which had sacrificed part of its 200 hours of intangible
investment to running the project and training operators (see
figure 2). Even if this deterioration of a service budget was
widely compensated by the gains of another service, one can
understand that the people responsible for the service would be
reticent (even hostile) about this project if their time had not
been accounted for as assistance to the production service's
investment project.29
- The mobilization of hidden performances not only helped to
finance the self-regulation project itself, but also to improve the
installation. It made the overall investment project
development possible in this workshop, including in the area of
the improvement of work conditions.
More generally speaking, we observed that the investment
selection criteria were more complete or more formalized than
in the methods the company usually uses, which enabled them
to progressively establish a multi-criteria method which was
adapted to the company.
For example, in the case we presented, one could wonder about
things like the impact of the project in the company's other
investments :
- Reducing the over-consumption of products or energy.
- Impact on waiting times.
- Effects on the costs of non-quality.
- Increase in the personnel's competence in self-regulation.
We noticed that this way of proceeding enabled the financial
evaluation of many criteria which remained only qualitative or
quantitative in multi criteria methods. For instance, the impact
of the increase in the personnel's overall competence could be
measured with the decrease in quality defects due to wrong
proportions used in sanding vats. The criteria which still were
not financially estimated were nevertheless clarified and
prioritized according to the company's strategic objectives.
For example, making operators responsible for self-regulation
was important considering the company's policy to turn
towards high quality products and services. One could have30
even imagined the case when driven them to not choose this
investment in comparison with another one with 50 000 francs
plus profitability, yet without an impact on these criteria of
making operators responsible. In this case, the directors could
have chosen this investment after all, and consider that the 50
000 francs gap make up a long term investment under the
"quality policy" category, in the frame work of a budget
handled by the company's Quality Direction.
CONCLUSION
The analysis of these experiments bring out three main
substantial results :
- The intangible investments made by the companies we
studied not only contributed to their long-term competitiveness,
but they often paid for themselves in a very short time as well
(an average of one year in the metal-working company).
Consequently, it would have been illusory to try to save on it
with the excuse of increasing the immediate results.
- The intangible investments which were associated with
investments in new equipment represented a small additional
cost compared to the tangible investment (6 % for example in
the case of the acquisition of a new press in the metal-working
company). Yet, they were an essential ingredient in the
profitability of the overall investment.
- The economic balances enabled them to enrich their usual
estimation methods, by accounting for not only the tangible
and intangible investments, but also their short-term and long-
term effects.31
It is now necessary to perfect this methodology in two main
areas :
- The consolidation methods of the economic balances, by
studying the problem of adding up results and the problem of
the possibility of separating the results of the various
investments into tangible and intangible components.
- The perfecting of financial analysis, by possibly accounting
for the impact of intangible investments on the estimation of
immobilized assets and calculating profitability.32
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